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The Attorney General wishes to supplement the 
ef heretofore filed on behalf of the appellant 
ilie instant matter. 
The Attorney General respectfully calls to the 
rt's attention the decision of the Utah Supreme 
tin State v. Seymour, No. 10596, wherein this 
t ruled that in the absence of a showing of pre-
ice, failure to provide counsel for a defendant 
the time of preliminary hearing was not a denial 
~nstitutional rights or otherwise prejudicial 
or. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorney General 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JERRY W. McGUFFEY, 
Pe ti tioner-Responden t, 
- vs - Case No. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 10561 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, John W. Turner, Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, appeals from a judgment of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, condition-
ally releasing the respondent, Jerry W. McGuffey, 
::i prisoner at the Utah State Prison, and ordering that 
McGuffey be returned to the Sixth Judicial District, 
Kane County, to stand trial on the charge of robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On September 13, 1965, Jerry W. McGuffey 
Plead guilty to the crime of robbery in the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Kane County, 
State of Utah, before the Honorable Ferdinand Erick-
son, District Judge. On the 22nd day of September .. 
2 
1965, he was sentenced to be committed to the Utar 
State Prison, Thereafter, on November 22, 1965, th6 
respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric 
Salt Lake County, alleging in his petition that th:. 
plea of guilty entered before the District Court o: 
the Sixth Judicial District had been coerced and th0: 
he had been denied his rights to counsel at the time 
of his preliminary hearing before the magistrate ir 
the justice's court in Kane County. An answe: 
to the petition for writ of habeas corpus was 
duly filed and hearing held thereon. Witnesse~ 
were called for both re s p on dent and ap 
pellant. On the 7th day of February, 1966, the Hon· 
orable Marcellus K. Snow entered his decision, 01 
dering that the petitioner be released from the Uta0 
State Prison and returned to Kane County to stan~ 
trial on the charges of robbery. The court found tha: 
the petitioner was not properly advised of his right: 
to have counsel appointed prior to the preliminary 
hearing without legal advice from counsel and th3· 
his plea of guilty to the charge of robbery was er. 
tered without counsel and with the reasonable belie: 
that such plea was necessary to obtain the release 
of his wife and prevent her prosecution for th' 
crime of robbery. 
On the 10th day of February, 1966, the distnc 
court entered an amended order providing for · 
stay of release of the petitioner pending appeal an: 
ordering his return for reprosecution within fiftef 
3 
days of affirmance by this court or fifteen days after 
dismissal of any appeal. 
On the 16th day of February, 1966, the appella~1t 
warden filed a notice of appeal to this court. The 
respondent filed a cross appeal on the 18th day 8I 
February, 1966, appealing the amended order of the 
court granting the stay of the release of Jerry W. 
McGuffey, pending this appeal. Subsequently, this 
court, upon motion of the respondent's new counsel, 
denied an application for release pending appec.l 
and bail. Consequently, the issues raised by the 
cross-appeal are now moot. 
The counsel for the respondent on appeal is 
not the same counsel who tried the case in the Dls-
trict Court of Salt Lake County on the respondent's 
application for a writ of habeas corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, Jerry W. McGuffey, a prisoner 
in the Utah State Prison, filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. The petition and amended 
petition alleged (1) the denial of counsel at prelim-
inary hearing, (2) coercion inducing the petitioner 
'.J enter his plea of guilty in the District Court of 
Kane County, which plea resulted in his confine-
ment in the Utah State Prison, and (3) that he was 
4 
not informed as to the consequences of his plea c: 
guilty (R. 8).1 
At the time of hearing on January 19, 1966, c 
transcript of the proceedings in the District Corn 
for the Sixth I udicial District, in and for Kane Coun-
ty, were received into evidence (Exhibit 1). It ap 
peared that at the time of the respondent's arraign-
ment on the 13th day of September, 1965, he ap-
peared without counsel, having theretofore waived 
preliminary hearing (T. 2). An amended information 
charging the respondent with the crime of robber/ 
was filed with the court. The respondent waived hls 
right to arraignment in Kane County and the matter 
was heard before the Honorable Ferdinand Erick-
son in Richfield, Sevier County. The court indicated 
with reference to the charges then pending agains1. 
the wife of the respondent that the charges wou!d 
be dismissed. The court then advised the respondent 
with reference to his right to counsel. The cour: 
stated: 
"The law of our State also provides, Jerry, that before 1 
you are required to enter a plea to the Information ' 
charging you with the commission of a felony that 
you are entitled to an attorney, whom you ma1 
either employ on your own or in the event you are 
unable financially to provide the funds, the court 
may appoint one or is obliged to appoint one for you 
to represent you. So do you want to employ one 0 ~ 
have the court appoint one for you? 
DEFENDANT: No. sir." 
(1) The transcript of proceedings in the District Court for Kane C?~r­
(Exhibit 1) will be referred to as "T." The proceedings in the DIS 1' 
Court of Salt Lake County will be referred to as "R." 
5 
On September 22, 1966, the respondent ap-
peared before the court again and the district at-
torney recited that he had additional information to 
the effect that the respondent had other charges 
against him and had committed other crimes in other 
parts of the United States. (T. 7-8). The court then 
asked the respondent whether the statements by 
the district attorney were true and respondent 
indicated that they were (T. 10). After the indication 
of the other involvement of the respondent, the judge 
indicated that the respondent had fooled him (T. 11). 
The respondent admitted that it was his purpose 
to take money from the victim of the robbery and 
that he would have taken whatever money she had 
(T. 12). The court then .asked the respondent if he 
121 The crime of robbery is actually punished by imprisonment in the Uta.h 
State Prison for a period of five years to life. However, since the peti-
tioner-respondent was advised that the penalty for the cri1n:e 'Yas more 
severe than it actually was under th~ Utah sta~utes, n? pre)udice c:o~d 
have resuled to him. Further, the tnal court did not m any way md1-
cate that its judgment ordering the releas~ of the petitioner-r~spondent 
was predicated upon any erroneous advice as to the possible con-
sequences of the plea of guilty. 
6 
desired to consult with counsel before sentencing 
and the respondent declined (T. 12). He was again 
advised as to the penalty and further advised as to 
his right to counsel, which he refused. The cour! 
then entered a sentence committing the respondent 
to the Utah State Prison. 
At the time of the hearing on the respondent's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he testified 
that he had been committed to the Utah State Prison 
on the 22nd day of September, 1965, for the crime ol 
robbery following his arrest in Kane County on Sep-
tember 8, 1965. (R. 34). He indicated that both his wife 
and he were charged with the crime of robbery 
(R. 35). Subsequent to his arrest, he was taken before 
a justice of the peace (R. 35). He indicated that he 
waived preliminary hearing (R. 36). He stated tha! 
prior to preliminary hearing, he had a conversation 
with the Sheriff and that the Sheriff advised him that 
it would be better if he waived preliminary hearing. 
(R. 36). He indicated that he could recali no state-
ment from Justice of the Peace Hepworth, who is the, 
justice before whom he appeared, except the state-; 
ment to the effect that he was being bound over for ' 
trial. (R. 37). On cross-examination, he indicated that 
he was never advised that he could have counse'. 
if he could afford it, although there is some am· 
biguity in his answers in the record (R. 49). He further 
indicated that prior to the time of the preliminary 
hearing, he had indicated to the Sheriff that he waE 
guilty. He did admit that he waived preliminan 
hearing (R. 49). He testified that subsequent to h;~ 
7 
waiver of preliminary hearing, he was bound over 
to the district court and appeared there on the 13th 
of September, 1965, and entered a plea to the charge. 
He indicated that prior to appearing in open court, 
he had a conversation with the Judge, the District 
Attorney, and the Sheriff at which conversation his 
wife was also present. He stated that probation was 
discussed and it was indicated that if he entered a 
plea of guilty he would be considered for proba-
tion (R. 38). He indicated that prior to that time, he 
had had a discussion with the Sheriff of Kane Coun-
ty in the Kane County Jail at Kanab, Utah, and that, 
more or less, the same thing was said. He further 
indicated that it was stated that if he plead guilty, 
the charges against his wife would be dropped (R. 
39). He further indicated that there some men-
tion about possibly expunging the record and ob-
t , taining his return to military service (R. 40-42). He 
stated that the judge indicated that the case would 
no be referred to the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department, but that the Sheriff would make an ex-
amination and advise the court (R. 40). He further 
testified that prior to the entry of his plea of guilty, 
he had a conversation with the Sheriff as to the feas-
ibility of obtaining counsel and that the Sheriff told 
him that that would slow things up and that counsel 
would have to come from Salt Lake (R. 41). He ad-
mitted that he was advised as to the consequences 
of his plea and did not impeach the record as to its 
recital that he was advised as to the right to have 
counsel (R. 42). 
8· 
On cross-examination, it appeared that the re 
spondent -had been convicted upon trial before a 
special Court-martial in the United States Air 
Force of AWOL under the Uni form Code ol 
Military Justice and spent three months in 
a military stockade (R. 47). The trial court took judi-
cial notice of the legal proceedings in special court-
m,artials (R. 48). He admitted that he was advised 
that he could have a preliminary hearing to deter-
mine whether there was probable cause to see il 
he was guilty. He further indicated that he wanted 
to waive the preliminary hearing, because he felt 
that he was guilty (R. 49-50). He stated that he was 
never promised probation but it was merely indi-
cated that he would be considered for it and that hG 
understood. there was no guarantee (R. 51). He rec-
ognized that Judge Erickson had not promised him 
probation (R. 51). He admitted that he was advised 
as to the right to counsel and stated that he plead 
guilty because "I didn't think it would be necessary 
to .plead not guilty and that I wanted to waive jury 
triq.L" m .. 53-54). He stated that he had no doubt in 
his mind as to the commission of the offense for 
which he. was charged (R. 54). The question was 
asked: "All right. Now, you plead guilty, knowing 
that you had committed that offense, didn't you? 
Answer: Yes." (R. 55). 
. The respondent fu:rthEff testified that the charges 
against -hjs ~wife, yvere1 _,in. fact, dropped. He further 
said. he reali:t::ed,-:that going back into the service 
d~pended on his.being accE3pted. 
Patricia May McGuffey testified that she w05 
9 
the wife of the respondent and that prior to the tim0 
he entered his plea of guilty, Sheriff Johnson had 
indicated that if the respondent would plead guilty, 
he might be able to get probation (R. 64). She didn't 
recall whether there wa.s any mention of charges 
against her and could not recall whether there wo.s 
any questions asked at preliminary hearing about 
an attorney (R. 64-65). Thereafter, after very leading 
questions from the respondent's counsel, she indi-
cated that she recalled a conversation concerning 
dropping charges and the possibility of the respon-
dent obtaining probation (R. 66-67). She stated that 
there was no doubt in her husband's mind that if he 
plead guilty, she wouldn't be prosecuted (R. 69). She 
stated that there was a conversation prior to the time 
he entered a plea of guilty with Judge Erickson, the 
District Attorney, and the Sheriff being present, 
where it was indicated that if the respondent plead 
guilty, he would be considered for probation, and at 
which time Judge Erickson also indicated that the 
charges would be dropped against her if her hus-
band plead guilty (R. 70). Mrs. McGuffey stated that 
she was still in love with her husband (R. 69). 
Sheriff LeNard Johnson of Kane County testified 
that he was present at the time of the magistrate's 
hearing. He said that the complaint was read and 
that the respondent was advised of his right to an 
attorney and that he could have an attorney at all 
oroceedings, if he wanted it, including preliminary 
hearing and that the district court would appom~ 
:Jne if he co u 1 d n' t afford one. (R. 70). He 
10 
indicated that the respondent had told 
him prior to the time of preliminary hearing that hE 
was guilty and wanted to waive a hearing and ge! 
it over with (R. 70). Sheriff Johnson said that he ad-
vised the respondent prior to the time 0£ the pre-
liminary hearing that he was entitled to counsel and 
that he also advised that if he couldn't afford it, that 
counsel would be appointed. (R. 73). At the time ol 
preliminary hearing, the Sheriff indicated that the 
respondent was advised again of his right to coun-
sel and that counsel would be appointed if he 
couldn't afford it (R. 70). Thereafter, the respondent 
waived preliminary hearing. 
The Sheriff indicated that subsequent to the 
waiver 0£ preliminary hearing, the subject of prob1i- • 
tion was discussed with the respondent, but that he 
never advised him that he would get it and never i 
advised him that he should plead guilty. The SheriE: 
indicated, in fact, that he advised him on several i 
occasions that he should plead not guilty and le1 
the court determine the issue (R. 74-75). He indicated. 
that at no time did he promise or indicate to the re : 
spondent that he would get probation. The respon-
1 
dent at no time testified that the was promised pro-
bation. 
The Sheriff stated that prior to the time of arraign· 
ment in the district court, both the respondent and 
his wife approached him and asked if there was a • 
possibility that a dismissal could be obtained agains
1 
the wife if the respondent plead guilty. He indicate~ 
that he didn't know, but that he would present the 
11 
matter to the District Attorney (R. 79). He indicated 
that he never advised the respondent that he should 
plead guilty. He further indicated that there was no 
agreement that if the respondent would plead guilty, 
the charges against his wife would be dropped. He 
stated that he felt the evidence simply did not sup-
port the charges against the wife and that the evi-
dence seemed to indicate that she had been led 
into the crime by her husband (R. 83). He stated that 
he would have recommended dropping the charges 
against the wife, even if there had been no guilty 
plea entered. 
The Sheriff further said that he never told Mc-
Guffey to waive counsel or that counsel would hav-3 
to come from Salt Lake City. 
The District Attorney, Ken Chamberlain, testi-
fied that he prosecuted Mr. McGuffey, that he first 
saw Mr. McGuffey at the time scheduled for his ar-
raignment on September 13, 1965, and that prior to 
that time, he had had no discussions with the re-
spondent (R. 87). He stated that there was a conversa-
tion in the chambers of I udge Erickson, at which 
time he, the sheriff, the judge, and Mr. and Mrs. Mc-
Guffey were present. He stated that prior to that time, 
the Sheriff had talked to him about possibility dis-
missing the charges against the respondent's wife. 
m. 87). He stated that there was no arrangement or 
agreement made to dismiss the charges against the 
respondent's wife in exchange for a plea of guilty 
by the respondent but that the evidence simply did 
12 
not justify continuing to press the charges against 
the respondent's wife because it appeared that Mrs. 
McGuffey's involvement in the crime was becaus:: 
of the domination of her husband (R. 88). He furths: 
indicated that there were no promises of probati011 
by himself, the Sheriff, or the Judge, at this time. Mr. 
Chamberlain further testified that it was not the prac-
tice to appoint counsel for indigents from Salt Lake 
City, but, rather, to obtain counsel for them ir: 
Richfield and that in his experience, he had never 
seen counsel appointed from Salt Lake City (R. 90) 
Mr. Chamberlain further testified that he had already 
decided to dismiss the charges against respondent's 
wife and that no condition that the respondent plead 
guilty was placed upon such a dismissal (R. 92). He 
stated that the respondent's plea was not a factor ir. 
the dismissal of the charges. He catagorically statei. 
that it was not reasonable to assume that Mr. Mc 
Guffey had been under the impression that it was 
necessary for him to plead guilty for the charge:. 
to be dismissed against his wife and that at no time 
had Judge Erickson made any promises in his pres 
ence to the respondent. 
Based upon the above evidence, the trial coUJ' 
found that the respondent was entitled to a writ o: 
habeas corpus based upon the failure to have coun 
sel at the time of preliminary hearing and the clai: 
that the respondent plead guilty in order to have the 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF HIS CON-
TENTION THAT HIS PLEA ENTERED AT THE TIME 
OF ARRAIGNMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
KANE COUNTY WAS INVOLUNTARY. 
The appellant submits that the trial court com-
mitted error in finding that there was any irregular-
ity or inpropriety at the time of the respondent's 
plea of guilty entered to the crime of robbery in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Kane County on Sep-
tember 13, 1965. The appellant submits that thG 
::ourt erred in two particulars: First, that the court 
~rred in finding that there was sufficient evidence 
tJ sustain the respondent's burden of proof that he 
was entitled to habeas corpus. Second, that the court 
erred in that it misapplied the law in weighing 
whether the respondent's plea of guilty was volur..-
tary. 
It is well established that an individual seek-
mg release from custody by petition for writ cf 
~:J.beas corpus has the burden of proof to demon-
3trate to the court that he is entitled to release. Ex-
parte Riddle, 57 Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal.Rep. 472, 372 P.2d 
304 (1962); 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, sec. 100; 25 Am. 
;.,r., Habeas Corpus, sec. 150. Consequently, it was 
·::::umbent upon the respondent in the instant case 
14 
to carry the burden of proof to show that he was en-
titled to a writ of habeas corpus. 
Recently, courts have recognized that there is 
an increasing use of the writ of habeas corpus to 
make inquiry into procedures occurring at the time. 
of trial or at the time of arraignment and that inquir1 
under habeas corpus is broader in scope than it has 
been previously, and it is not limited to the very · 
basic question of whether the individual having 
custody of the petitioner is entitled to have custody. 
because he is a person in proper authority, or tha\ ~ 
the individual having custody has jurisdiction to ex· i 
ercise dominion over the person in custody. Be- , 
cause of the expanded use of writs of habeas corpus : 
I 
and the fact that they are often post-conviction re- ! 
I 
trials of the issues previously heard by a court, ap·, 
pellate courts have imposed a rather heavy burder: I 
of proof upon an individual seeking release from ! 
custody by habeas corpus. ' 
In Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 1009 
(1957), the Kansas Supreme Court stated with rel·: 
erence to a habeas corpus proceeding: 
"In this type of proceeding, the petitioner has ~he 
burden of proving the grounds upon which he rehes , 
for his release *** and he must establish his allega· 
tions by a clear and convincing preponderance of the 
evidence because a judgment of conviction bears 8 
presumption of regularity and validity.'' 
In Montgomery v. Hand. 183 Kan. 118, 325 P.2c 
69 (1958), the Kansas Supreme Court again stated: 
15 
"However, the burden was upon the petitioner to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds 
upon which he relies for his release." 
In Application of Gaskill, 335 P.2d 1088 (Court 
of Crim. App. Okla. 1959), the court noted: 
"Moreover, to vacate a judgment and sentence by 
habeas corpus for alleged denial of fundamental con-
stitutional rights, where the judgment is regular on 
its face, the proof must be clear, convincing and with-
out doubt." 
In In Re O'Neill, 359 P2d 619 (Court of Crim. 
App. Okla. 1961), the court again indicated that in 
order to justify the release of a petitioner, by habeas 
corpus, the evidence showing a violation of con-
stitutional rights must be clear and convincing. It 
is noteworthy that the O'Neill case involved a claim 
by a petitioner that his plea of guilty was coerced 
because of threats by a county attorney that he 
would be turned over to a mob unless he entered 
a. plea of guilty. 
In Farmer v. Raines, 276 P.2d 633 (Okl. Crim. 
1962), the syllabus of the court indicated: 
"Public policy demands that the charges of petitioner 
in habeas corpus proceedings should be clear and con-
vincing and should be corroborated by clear and con-
vincing proof." 
Thus, the courts are recognizing that in the ab-
sence of an obvious defect in the record of any pro-
reedings, an individual seeking his release from 
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custody by habeas corpus should demonstrate b 
clear and convincing evidence that his detention l: 
unlawful. Certainly, there must be a presumptio: 
of judicial regularity and a recognition that wheE 
an individual enters a plea of guilty he does s: 
under circumstances which are not inherently coe; 
cive. A defendant is before the court and can makec 
statement in his own behalf and if it appears, as: 
does in this case, that the respondent was cleafr 
advised of his rights to counsel, it would seem to b 
a matter of sound public policy to require the persc· 
in custody to demonstrate by clear and convincinc 
evidence that he is unjustifiably held. 
It is submitted that in the instant case, the re-
spondent in no way met the required burden l . 
proof. In respect to the determination of the cou' 
that the respondent's plea of guilty was in provider'· 
ly entered, it is submitted that such a finding is nc, 
supported by clear and convincing evidence ar.: 
is contrary to the weight of testimony presented ; . 
the time of trial. 
First, the transcript of proceedings of tr.-
respondent's arraignment clearly indicates th a . 
at the time he entered his plea of guilty, he was we 
aware that the charges against his wife had bee'. 
dropped. The district attorney amended the inforrr:: 
tion, and the court in questioning the responde 
obtained the response of the respondent and hew> 
aware of the fact the charges had been dropped. n 
court thereafter very carefully advised the respor 
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ent of his rights to appear in Kane County and the 
respondent intelligently waived his appearance in 
Kane County and entered his plea in Sevier County. 
The court then went on to advise respondent that 
before he was required to enter a plea to the in-
formaion, that he was entitled to an attorney, and 
the court stated: "Whom you may either employ on 
your own, or in the event you are unable financially 
to provide the funds, the court may appoint one or 
is obliged to appoint one for you to represent you." 
The court then asked the respondent if he desired 
counsel and he stated: "No, sir." (T. 3). Thereafter. 
the respondent was advised as to the penalty that 
could be imposed by the court in the event the court 
saw fit to do so. The information was read and the re-
spondent was advised that he was entitled to time to 
consider the matter before he entered a plea of guilty. 
The respondent replied that he was ready to enter 
his plea at that time. The court then asked the re-
spondent how he plead to the information and he 
replied: "Guilty, sir." (T. 4). Thereafter, the respond-
ent's sentencing was delayed pending a determina-
tion as to his background and whether there were 
any other charges pending against him. At the time 
respondent appeared for sentencing, he was again 
advised as to his right to counsel and again he 
waived counsel. He was further advised, again, as 
to the consequences of his plea and the possibility 
that he could be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for a period of five years to life and after such 
ci.dvice, the respondent still indicated that he did not 
:lesire counsel. 
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The District Attorney informed the court as 1c 
prior difficulties the respondent had been involved 
in, and the respondent admitted that the Districi 
Attorney's statement was correct. At no time, doe1 
it appear from the transcript, that the respondent, lu 
any way, desired to have his plea set aside, nor dla 
he at any time indicate that he was under coercim 
or misapprehension. There is nothing in the tran 
scripts of proceedings at the time of the respondent'~ 
arraignment or his sentencing that demonstrates an1 
illegality. 
At the time of the hearing, the respondent testi 
fied that when he entered his plea of guilty, he rec 
ognized that there was no promise of probation ana 
that he would only be considered for probation. 
Further, the trial court on habeas corpus made nc 
finding to the effect that the respondent was under 
any misapprehension as to the liklihood of his re-
ceiving probation if he entered a plea of guilty. Tnc 
respondent stated that he had discussed the que& 
tion of entering a plea of guilty with the District A: 
torney, the Sheriff, and the Judge, immediately prior 
to his arraignment (R. 38). The respondent further 
testified that at this conference with the Judge, he 
was told that he was entitled to counsel but tha! 
counsel would have to come from Salt Lake Citl' 
and that since he was being considered for proba 
tion anyway, he didn't see where it was necessary 
This was rebutted by t h e District Attorney 
Further, the respondent indicated that he plea0, 
guilty knowing he had committed the offense anc 
might go to prison (R. 55). The respondent's wile 
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testified that she was present at a pre-arraignment 
meeting in chambers where the District Attorney, 
the Sheriff, and the Judge and her husband were 
also present. She indicated, at the outset, (R. 64), that 
she didn't recall if there was anything mentioned 
regarding any charges against her. She further in-
dicated that she couldn't recall what Judge Erickson 
had said specifically (R. 70). However, in other in-
stances, she says that she recalled the conversation 
concerning dropping the charges. 
n On the opposite side, the District Attorney testi-
c fied that there was a conversation, but that at no 
a time was there any indication to the respondent 
that counsel would have to be brought from Salt n. 
ic Lake City, nor was there any promise made to him. 
;r The District Attorney indicated that the reason the 
charges were dropped against the respondent's wife e-
10 was because the case against her was weak. This 
& was corroborated by the Sheriff, who stated that the 
l: original request to drop the charges against the re-
ir spondent's wife if he plead guilty, came from the 
31 respondent himself. The Sheriff indicated that at no 
1e time did he advise the respondent to plead guilty, 
a! but to the contrary, had advised him several times 
11
, to plead not guilty and to get the matter heard by 
a the court. He further stated that the respondent had 
y indicated that he was guilty and would like to get 
y it over with. The testimony of the Sheriff and the 
10 District Attorney, both men with unimpeachable 
10 backgrounds, was exactly to the opposite of that of 
1e the respondent. There is nothing in the record to 
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support the respondent's contentions of duress or 
coercion and, in addition, it should be remembered 
that the respondent had previously been convicted 
of a military offense and spent time in a military con. 
finement facility. Further, he had committed several 
other violations of law throughout the United States 
which were committed at the time of the sentencinq, , 
which would tend to cast substantial doubt on his . 
veracity. 
With the posture of the evidence being such as 
indicated above, it cannot be said that the respond-
ent carried his burden to prove by clear and con· : 
vincing evidence that he was entitled to release. 
It is well established that where an individual , 
is fully advised of his rights and waives his right to ' 
counsel, there is no constitutional violation of the I 
right to counsel. State v. Spiers, 12 U.2d 14, 361 P.2d: 
509 (1961). In the Spiers case, this court noted firs!! 
that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to : 
show that he had been denied his constitutional; 
rights and stated: 
"There was no evidence of fear or coercion, or any ' 
other reason why he was induced to waive his righ~, : 
other than he thought the course he took was for his i 
best good. There was nothing to indicate that at any : 
stage of the proceedings he did not understand what 
was going on, the questions asked or the effect ol 
the waiver of counsel. In view of this situation, ~e 
conclude that the trial court's finding that he intell~; 1 
gently waived his right to counsel must be sustained. 
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In the instant case, there is no evidence of any 
fear or threats or coercion of any kind. The only 
evidence before the trial court was that the respond-
ent felt that the best course to follow would be to 
plead guilty. Consequently, there was clearly an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and a volun-
tary plea of guilty. 
In Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966), 
two state prisoners serving life sentence in the Ala-
bama State Penitentiary sought federal writs of 
habeas corpus. Each had been charged with a capital 
crime. One was charged with forceable rape, and 
one had been charged with murder in the first de-
gree. Each had plead guilty to the charges in re-
liance upon the prosecutor's promise that he would 
not seek the death penalty. The prosecutor did not 
seek the death penalty. The court indicated that 
there was no basis for habeas corpus. The court 
stated: 
"The important thing is not that there shall be no 
'deal' or 'bargain' but that the plea shall be genuine, 
by a defendant who is guilty; one who understands 
his situation, his rights and the consequences of his 
plea and is neither deceived nor coerced." 
In this case, there was no showing that the plea 
of guilty entered by the respondent wasn't with fu~l 
understanding as to the nature and consequences 
of the plea. Even assuming the position taken by 
the respondent that he plead guilty in order to ob-
tain the dismissal of charges against his wife, it does 
not appear that that plea was inprovident. Indeed, 
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at the time of the sentencing, the respondent virtual-
ly admitted his guilt to the crime and did so again 
at the time of the habeas corpus hearing. Conse-
quently, there appears to be a plea by an individual 
who was guilty and who fully understood the 
reasons and circumstances surrounding the charges 
against him. The fact that there may have been some 
deal or bargain would not vituate the plea, if there 
was no deceit or coercion. Since the charges were, 
in fact, dismissed against the respondent's wife, i\ 
cannot be claimed that there is any basis for habeas 
corpus. 
In People v. Defulmer, 209 N.E.2d 93 (N.Y. 1965), 
the court indicated that there was no violation of 
due process for a court to receive a plea of guilty to 
second degree murder and sentence a defendant 
who is only fourteen years of age where the desire 
was to avoid the consequences of a possible first 
degree murder conviction and mandatory death 
sentence. In this case, the respondent was twenty-
three years of age, was married, had had military 
experience, had previously been before some form 
of a judicial tribunal3 and, apparently, was fully ad-
vised by the court at the time the plea was entered 
as to the nature and consequences of the plea. · 
Most recently, in Tipton v. State, 194 Kan. 705, 
402 P.2d 310 (1965), the Kansas Supreme Court indi-
(3) The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for an ru:rai~ent y,r~; 
ceeding very comparable to that in the ~ederal courts m trials be artlal 
general, special, and summary courtmarbals. Manual for Courtm 
1951 p. 107; 10 U.S.C., secs. 836-854. 
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cated that the record did not substantiate the de-
fendant's claim that his plea was coerced or that 
the prosecution failed to carry out promises to at-
tempt to obtain leniency. 
In People v. Schiskie. 263 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. 
1965), the court indicated that absent any oHicial de-
ception and trickery, even though the defense at-
torney did advise the defendant to plead guilty and 
that probation would be granted, it did not warrant 
withdrawal of the plea of guilty. 
In People v. Nooner, 46 Cal.Rep. 680 (1965), the 
court upheld the decision of the trial court by re-
fusing to allow the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, 
based upon an agreement with the district attorney 
to dismiss another charge. In doing so, the court 
noted: 
"This case is one of an increasing number involving a 
trial by the defendant of our judges, district attor-
neys, and defense counsel." 
It is submitted that much of the contentions of 
the respondent at the time 0£ trial were merely ac-
cusaions against the court, the district attorney, and 
the sheriff, which, but for his testimony, were not 
supported by the evidence. 
In Hulett v. Sigler. 242 F.Supp. 705 (Neb. 1965), 
the court indicated that even though a guilty plea 
was effected through negotiation with the district 
attorney in order that an habitual criminal charge 
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would be dropped, the circumstances were not that 
they overcame the defendant's ability to make a vol-
untary decision and application for habeas corpus, 
on the basis of a coerced plea, would not be sus-
tained. 
In In Re Garceau's Petition, 212 A.2d 633 (Vt. 
1965), the defendant plead guilty and received the 
sentence which the state's attorney recommended. 
The court noted that he had a free choice to reject 
the offer, and, apparently, plead guilty knowing the 
consequences of his plea. Under these circum· 
stances, the court said that the contention that the 
plea was coerced could not be sustained. 
In Queor v. State, 17 4 So.2d 687 (Ala. 1965), the 
court indicated that an agreement worked out in ac· 
cordance with an understanding between the de-
f endan t and the prosecution that he would receive 
a sentence of: life imprisonment, if he changed his 
plea, does not amount to coercion. Plea bargaining 
does not necessarily render a plea of guilty improvi· 
dent or coerced. Quite to the contrary, plea bargain· 
ing is very often the only means that a defense 
counsel has to assist his client. Steinberg and Paul-
son, A Conversation with Defense Counsel, The 
Problem of a Criminal Defense, ABA, pages 47-49 
(1961). 
In the case of State v. Plum, 14 U .2d 17 4, 378 P.2d 
671 (1963), this court had before it a contention mad9 
by a 23-year old defendant that the trial court had 
I 
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erred in refusing to allow him to change his plea ot 
guilty after a deal had been made with the prosecu-
tor that if he agreed to plead guilty, the prosecutor 
would recommend probation .. This court noted that 
the mere fact that a bargain is reached between thG 
prosecutor and the defendant does not mean that 
the plea was improvidently entered where the pros-
ecutor otherwise carried out his end of the bargain. 
This case is precedent for reversal in the instant 
case. 
In Cipes, Moore's Federal Practice (Rule~ of 
Criminal Procedure ); para. 11.05 [4J, it is stated: 
"Prosecutor promises to make some concession other 
than a sentencing recommendation, such as dismissal 
of a related indictment, or dismissal of certain counts 
in the indictment to which the plea is made. Unlike 
sentence, these are not matters within the exclusive 
province of the court and the prosecutor will usually 
be able to obtain the court's consent to dismissal. The 
only question then is whether the prosecutor keeps 
his promise." 
Thus, if the charges are actually dismissed, it does 
not appear that the courts will find that there has 
been an improvident plea, if it was understandably 
made. See also Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 
16th Cir. 1959). 
In Holt v. United States, 329 F.2d 368 (7th Ctr. 
1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 992, the court ruled that 
a plea was not coerced where there was a consent 
to dismissal of one indictment in exchange for 'a 
uloJ to another. 
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In Martin v. United States. 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 
1958), the defendant plead guilty on certain charges 
in exchange for a concession from the United States 
attorney to dismiss a kidnapping count. The court 
refused to find that the plea of guilty had been 
coerced or was otherwise improvidently entered. 
The court noted that the United States Supreme 
Court had indicated in one case that "perhaps, a 
plea of guilty induced in part by promises may 
nevertheless be trustworthy." The court went on 
to say: 
"So far as we know, no court has held that anY such 
concession made by the prosecution necessitates the 
finding that a plea was involuntary. The crucial issue 
appears to be whether, with all the facts before him, 
including the advice of competent counsel, the plea 
was truly voluntary. The Supreme Court lays down 
no other test." 
The court relied upon the decision of Traver v. 
United States. 203 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1953), where the 
court had found that entering a plea on two counts 
in an indictment in consideration of the remaining 
count being dismissed did not render the plea in· 
voluntary. Many other cases so holding are collect-
ed in 35 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1. 
Based upon the above authorities and assuming 
that the court would believe the testimony of the 
respondent over that of the Sheriff and Dis-
trict Attorney, it would still appear that the plea 
which was en t e red by the respondent un· 
circumstances where he heard and understood 
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what was occurring was voluntary. In Re Johnson. 
42 Cal.Rep. 228, 62 Cal.2d 325, 398 P.2d 420 (1965) 
Under these circumstances, it appearing further 
that there was substantial evidence of guilt which 
would tend to support the very conclusion that the 
respondent's plea was entered because of an ac-
knowledgment of guilt as distinct from some other 
reason, there is no legal basis for habeas corpus. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
LEASE UPON HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE OF ANY 
FAILURE OF PROPER ADVICE AT THE TIME OF PRE-
LIMINARY HEARING. 
The trial court apparently found that there was 
some irregularity at the time the respondent ap-
peared before the justice's court for preliminary 
hearing, which irregularity was such as to warrant 
his release by habeas corpus. It is submitted that 
the decision of the trial court cannot be sustained 
on two grounds. First, it is submitted that the evi-
dence does not support the contention that the re-
spondent was not properly advised as to his rights 
to counsel at preliminary hearing and that he did 
not properly waive preliminary hearing. Secondly, 
it is submitted that a preliminary hearing is not a 
"critical stage" at which the appointment of counsel 
is necessary; and, consequently, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, there was no violation of 
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the respondent's constitutional rights, even if he 
were not afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel 
at the time of preliminary hearing. 
At the time of the hearing for collateral relief in 
the trial court, the respondent testHied that he ap-
peared before a Justice of the Peace for preliminary 
hearing. He indicated that he didn't recall any evi-
dence being given and that he did not have an a'-
torney. He testified that he did enter a waiver cf 
preliminary hearing (R. 36). He stated that he did 
have a conversation with the Sheriff prior to pre-
liminary hearing and the Sheriff told -him that he 
would be better off without a preliminary hearinc;. 
The Sheriff testified· to the contrary, that he never 
advised the respondent to waive preliminary hear-
ing, but that the respondent indicated that he wc1s 
guilty and he wanted to get it over with. Respond-
ent indicated on direct examination that he did net 
recall any other statement made by the justice of 
the ·peace, except that.he was being bound over to 
stand trial (R.. ::37)_, 
"', ' - ' • "~ "( ! ,r ; -. I'" ' 
.·._ ..• -.-On ~ro~~-<ex~minati()n, the respondent indicated 
that the Ju~tice of the Peace advised him that he 
could have a preliminary hearing to determin,; 
whether there was probable cause to see if he wa'O 
quilty (R. 49). ·f"IE?. stated, that he had indicated he 
w~:r;i;~ed t9 w9iv,Ff preh~~iAary hearing and get it over 
b;e~51µse;,9~IWPR·~~Alt;y.-J)rn,t statement was mad• 
p_ .r:ior1to 1 t0.e tiµfe .. he~;wq.ived preliminary hearinQ 
" ' • -.,. . ; ,' • , ~ • J. • ) ) . '· '. ) ' ' , . , I - • 
Furt!"ier, prior)o the time he waived preliminar 
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hearing, he had told the sheriff that he was guilty 
(R. 50). 
Sheriff Johnson who was present at the time of 
the preliminary hearing indicated that the respond-
ent was advised of his rights to have a preliminary 
hearing, of his rights to have counsel, and to have 
counsel even if he was impecunious. The Sheriff 
further testified that the Justice of the Peace advised 
the respondent that the district court would appoint 
counsel for him at all stages of the proceedings, in-
cluding the preliminary hearing, and further, that 
he also advised the respondent that he could have 
counsel. 
Mrs. McGuffey, who was also present at the 
time of the preliminary hearing, did not, at the hear-
ing on the habeas corpus petition, offer any testi-
mony as to the lack of any advice as to the right to 
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. 
Further, the District Attorney testified that coun-
sel had been previouslv appointed in preliminary 
hearings on criminal charges in Kane County in the 
past (R. 95). 
Thus, it appears that the only evidence going to 
the question of whether the respondent was advised 
of his rights to counsel at the time of preliminary 
hearing was offered by the respondent himself and 
was not, in any manner, corroborated. 
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As noted from the authorities cited in Point I 
of this brief, infra, page 15, the burden of proof 
to demonstrate a violation of constitutional right en-
titling a petitioner to release by habeas corpus is 
upon the petitioner and the burden must be met by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
In Wilson v. Hudspeth, 165 Kan. 666, 198 P.2d 
165 (1948), the court in die a ted that the unsupported 
and uncorroborated statements of the petitioner 
given at a habeas corpus proceeding would not car-
ry the burden of proving his entitlement to release 
for violation of his constitutional rights. 
In Flowers v. State, 90 Okl. Crim. 390, 214 P.2d 
728 (1950), the Oklahoma court stated that in a habeas 
corpus proceeding by an inmate of the prison to 
obtain his release, that testimony from the inma:e 
alone, or even when supported by the testimony of 
another inmate, is not entitled to much weight. 
In Exparte Langley. 325 P.2d 1094 (Okl. Crim 
1958), the court indicated that the uncorroborated 
and unsupported statements of the petitioner would 
not meet the requirements of the standard of burden 
of proof to entitle the petitioner to release on habeas 
corpus. 
In Exparte Mathews, 85 Okl. Crim. 173, 186 P.2d 
840 (1947), the Oklahoma court indicated that public 
policy did not permit a petitioner on habeas corpus 
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alone in a record, but relief must be based upon 
something more substantial and the petitioner's testi-
mony must be corroborated by clear and convincinq 
proof. 
Most recently, in Hicks v. Hand, 189 Kan. 415, 369 
P.2d 250 (1962), the Kansas Supreme Court indicated 
that the standard of proof necessary to justify the is-
suance of a writ of habeas corpus is not met by the 
uncorroborated and unsupported statements of the 
petitioner. 
Consequently, it is submitted that in the instant 
case, the facts relating to the advice given the re-
spondent as to counsel at the time of preliminary 
hearing is not sufficient to support the respondent's 
contention that he was not properly advised. Espe-
cially is this so where the Sheriff who was present 
testified to the contrary, the respondent's wife of-
fered no evidence to rebut the Sheriff's testimony 
on this issue, and where the District Attorney indi-
cated that counsel had, in fact, been appointed at 
preliminary hearings in Kane County in the past. It 
is submitted that the respondent did not sustain his 
burden of proof on the issue of failure to be prop-
erly advised as to counsel at the time of preliminary 
hearing. 
Further, it is submitted that even were this court 
to accept the uncorroborated testimony of the re-
spondent, to the effect that he was not advised of his 
:ight to counsel at the time of preliminary hearing 
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or otherwise afforded an opportunity to have coun-
sel at preliminary hearing, that this would not justify 
his release on habeas corpus. It should be remem-
bered that prior to the time the respondent appeared 
at preliminary hearing, he confessed his guilt by his 
own admission to the Sheriff of Kane County. His ap-
pearance at preliminary hearing before the Justice of 
the Peace resulted in a waiver of the preliminary 
hearing only. No plea was entered nor other action 
taken which could have prejudiced the respondent 
in any fashion. Under these circumstances, it is 
clear that there is no violation of any constitutioncJ 1 
rights. 
This was the same issue which was before the 
court in State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 
(1951). In that case, this court noted that: 
"The preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not a trial-
it is held in the place of the common law grand jury 
where the accused is only present if called as a wit-
ness and is never represented by counsel." 
The court noted that at the preliminary hearing in 
the Braasch case, there was no prejudice to the de 
fendants from the failure to have counsel and that 
they had previously confessed to police officials. 
Thus, the court determined that there could be no 
prejudice to the defendants. 
The facts of that case bear a resemblance to the 
evidence in this case when taken in a light ove-; 
whelmingly favorable to respondent and even el· 
ceed the circumstances favorable to respondent in 
the instant case. 
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Since the decision of the Braasch case, the 
United States Supreme Court has handed down 
opinions in two cases which it may be argued hav-'3 
some effect upon the Braasch decision. The first is 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). In that case, 
the court held that arraignment could be a "critical 
stage," when, as in Alabama, the defendant, if he is 
to raise the defense of insanity at all, must raise it or 
make a plea of abatement or other motions of pro-
cedural concern. The court in the Hamilton case 
said that, therefore, arraignment is a "critical stage," 
;equiring the advice as to counsel or the appoint-
ment of counsel. The Hamilton case is entirely dis-
tinguishable from the situation in the present case, 
since the defendant here was not obligated to make 
any plea of any kind at the time of preliminary hear-
ing, and motions were not lost by the failure to be 
raised at the time of preliminary hearing. Further. 
since the petitioner subsequently plead guilty, if 
that guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently en-
tered after waiving counsel, there could be no preju-
dice. 
In White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), the ac-
cused, unrepresented by counsel at preliminary 
hearing, entered a plea of guilty to a capital offense. 
Thereafter, he entered a plea of not guilty at the 
time of his arraignment. The plea of guilty that he 
entered at the time of preliminary hearing was of-
fered in evidence against him at the time of trial. 
The United States Supreme Court said that in view 
,.1 the fact that a plea could be entered at the time 
' 
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of preliminary hearing and was, in fact, entered 
' 
preliminary hearing in the Maryland situation was 
a critical stage. Once again, however, that case is 
clearly no precedent for the instant fact situation. 
The courts have generally recognized that a 
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage within the 
meaning of Hamilton and White. 
In DeToro v. Peppersack. 332 F.2d 341 (4th C!r. 
1964), a state prisoner sought a petition of writ o! 
habeas corpus from a federal court. The matter came 
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
court ruled that under Maryland law, as modified 
since the White decision, that a preliminary hearing 
was not a critical stage of judicial process and that 
defenses not raised were not irretrievably lost. 
Therefore, the failure to appoint counsel for the 
accused charged with murder did not violate his 
constitutional right to counsel. The court stated: 
"Despite the very able arguments advanced by coun· 
sel for DeToro, we are unable to accept either of 
these contentions. We take as our starting point, as 
do the parties, Powell v. Alabama, supra, which states 
the broad proposition that an accused has the right 
to counsel 'at every step in the proceedings again~! 
him.' 287 U.S. at 69, 53 S.Ct. at 64. In Powell, this 
was taken to mean that the accused has the right to 
have counsel appointed sufficiently in in advance ol 
trial to make adequate preparation. Later decisions 
of the Court have reaffirmed the importance of pre· 
trial preparation. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 
446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940). 
Mr. Justice black warned that: 
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'[TJhe denial of opportunity for appointed coun-
sel to confer, to consult with the accused and to 
prepare his defense, could convert the appoint-
ment of counsel into a sham and nothing more 
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's 
requirement that an accused be given the assist-
andce of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee 
of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by 
mere formal appointment.' 
While Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, and White v. 
Maryland, supra, have further extended the right to 
counsel prior to trial, we are unable to read them as 
extending that right to the extent and in the man-
ner urged by DeToro. In Hamilton, the defendant, 
indicated for burglary, and without counsel, entered 
a plea of not guilty at arraignment. The Supreme 
Court reversed his later conviction, holding that the 
defendant had been entitled to counsel since, under 
Alabama law, arraignment is 'a critical stage in a 
criminal proceeding.' 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct. at 158. 
It was a critical stage, according to the Court, because 
certain defenses, specifically a plea of insanity, a plea 
in abatement, and a motion to quash based on an im-
properly drawn grand jury, not raised at arraignment, 
were considered waived. 
In White, the accused was without counsel at a pre-
liminary hearing. Unlike arraignment under Alabama 
law, a preliminary hearing under Maryland law is 
not, in and of itself, a critical stage in the judicial 
process. Defenses not raised at a preliminary hearing 
are not irretrievably lost and may be raised later. In 
the context of the particular facts of White, however, 
the Court was persuaded that White's preliminary 
hearing had been a critical stage. This was so because 
White's plea of guilty, taken at the preliminary hear-
ing and subsequently withdrawn, was introduced into 
evidence against him during trial. On this ground, the 
Court reversed the conviction. 
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DeToro calls our attention to what he considers to be 
the key sentence of the case: 
'For petitioner entered a plea before the magis-
trate and that plea was taken at a time when he 
had no counsel.' 373 U.S. at 60, 83 S.Ct. 1051. 
The district court, we think, effectively brought the 
above sentence into the proper prospective: 
'This sentence cannot be read out of context. It 
must relate to the case before the Court, namely 
that the "plea" was "guilty", and it was offered 
in evidence at the trial.' 222 F.Supp. at 624. 
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that an ac· 
cused is denied rights afforded him under the sixth 
amendment when he is subjected to an arraignment 
or to a preliminary hearing without the assistance of 
counsel, where events transpire that are likely to 
prejudice his ensuing trial. The court, in each case, 
refused to speculate as to whether in fact prejudice 
actually accrued. 
Thus, the thrust of Powell's admonition that an ac· 
cused has a right to counsel 'at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him,' as borne out by subsequent 
decisions, including Hamilton and White, seems io 
be that if the effectiveness of legal assistance ulti· 
mately furnished an accused is likely to be prejudiced 
by its prior denial, the earlier period may be deemed 
a critical stage in the judicial process and a convic-
tion obtained in such circumstances is rendered in· 
valid. We find nothing in the Supreme Court de· 
cisions, however, that would permit us to extend the 
duty of the State to appoint counsel in proceedin~' 
where even the likelihood of later prejudice arising 
from the failure to appoint is absent." 
It should be noted that the United States Cou:' 
l~ 
- "37 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crause, 
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to both 
White and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has no 
constitutional right to be furnished counsel at a pre-
liminary hearing in a state court capital case. In that 
case, two individuals by the names of Latham and 
York were responsible for a series of killings 
throughout the United States, and were tried and 
convicted of murder in Kansas after being appre-
hended in Utah. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied on its previous decision in Utah v. Sullivan, 
227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952). It stated: 
"The first contention is that petitioners were entitled 
to have counsel appointed for them prior to the pre-
liminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed on the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Gideon v. Wainright, Corrections Director, 372 U.S. 
385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799. That case concerned 
the right of an accused to counsel at trial-not at a 
preliminary hearing. In State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10 
Cir., 227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom. 
Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973, 76 S.Ct. 449, 100 
L.Ed. 844, we held that in circumstances where an ac-
cused did not enter a plea of guilty at a preliminary 
hearing, did not make a confession, did not testify 
and did not say anything of an incriminating nature, 
the failure to furnish counsel at such hearing did not 
abridge the accused's fundamental constitutional 
rights. That decision is controlling here. No claim is 
made of any incriminating statements or acts of na-
tion. All they did was to waive the right to a prelim-
inary hearing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground 
that counsel would have forceci the prosecution to 
disclose at least some of its evidence. The point is 
not well taken as more than a month in advance uf 
trial copies of the confessions and lists of the prosecu-
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tion witnesses were given defense counsel. Our con-
clusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are supported bv 
the decisions of other circuits. We find nothing in 
Gideon v. Wainright which requires a review of the 
decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan." 
Further, most recently, Loato v. Cox. 344 F.2d 
916 (10th Cir. 1965), the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap. 
peals in a percuriam opinion adhered to its position. 
The court noted that the preliminary proceedings 
were entirely independent of the prisoner's formal 
arraignment and sentencing, and at the time of pre-
liminary hearing, the prisoner had already signed a 
statement. He appeared before a justice of the 
peace without counsel and thereafter at the time of 
arraignment entered a plea of guilty. The court con· 
eluded the prisoner was in no way deprived of any 
constitutional right. This case seems to be rather 
directly in point for authority in the instant case thct 
if McGuffey was adequately appraised of counsel 
at the time of arraignment and intelligently waived 
the same, he could not complain of any defect at 
the time of preliminary hearing. 
A similar case is United States v. Rundle, 349 
F.2d 952 (3rd Cir. 1965). 
In Vol. II, No. 4, of the Defender News Letter, 
July 6, 1965, there is an excellent discussion of the 
right to counsel at preliminary hearing. It is noted: 
"Some courts have understood the White case tri 
mean that the absence of counsel at the prelimimin 
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hearing is not a violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights, if the absence of counsel is not, in the 
eyes of the court, prejudicial." 
Thus, in People v. Daniels, 199 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. 
1964), an Illinois appellate court saw no deprivation 
of the accused's right to counsel, since: 
'there is neither a claim or any showing that the 
absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing or 
a failure of an earlier appointment of counsel in 
any manner prejudiced the defendant or in any 
way adversely affected or contaminated the sub-
sequent proceedings in the case.'" 
The same newsletter notes: 
"Other courts have found there to be no constitu-
tional injury in the failure to appoint counsel where 
no plea offered at the preliminary hearing could be 
offered in evidence at the trial *** ." 
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reineke. 333 
F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1964), the United States Court of 
Appeals reasoned that the preliminary hearing in 
Connecticut could not be deemed a critical stage. 
The court stated: 
"The Connecticut hearing in probable cause has been 
accurately characterized as a mere 'inquest' made to 
determine the existence of probable cause, and to 
discharge the accused if none exist * * *. The finding 
of probable cause is not final and it cannot be used 
against the accused on trial before the superior court . 
••• 
The Connecticut hearing in probable cause cannot, 
therefore, be characterized as critical as in the arraign-
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ment in Alabama. Indeed, it can hardly be termed a 
proceeding against the accused. To the contrary, it 
appears to operate entirely for the accused's benefit. 
And the mere fact that an accused is required to 
plead does not, in itself, demand the contrary con-
clusion where the plea entered is a self-serving denial 
of guilt. At trial, appellant had every opportunity to 
present any events that was available initially." 
Further, in Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Ida. 
1964), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated: 
"While it is recognized that an accused has a right 
to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, we do 
not understand this to mean that he must be so rep· 
resented in the preliminary processes which take 
p 1 a c e primarily for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether a crime has been committed and whether 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ac· 
cused has committed it, and particularly, where no 
prejudice has befallen him." 
Numerous decisions from other courts from 
other states support the proposition urged in this 
brief. 
Thus, in Montgomery v. State, 176 So.2d 33l 
(Fla. 1965), the court ruled that a preliminary hear 
ing was not a critical stage in Florida. Defendant 
had not been informed of his right to counsel ai 
arraignment before the magistrate on preliminary 
hearing. 
In State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 (1964) 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the lack of reP 
resentation by counsel at the time of preliminar' 
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hearing did not violate the constitutional rights cf 
the defendant who did not request appointment and 
made no claim that there was any particular preju-
dice at the time of his trial from the failure to have 
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. The Su-
preme Court of Kansas cited the Tenth Circuit Court 
case in Latham v. Crause. supra, and indicated that 
the purpose of a preliminary hearing in Kansas was 
comparable to Utah in that it was an inquiry to de-
termine probable cause and nothing more. 
A similar result was reached by the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court in French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593, 
396 P.2d 423 (1964). 
In State v. Jackson. 400 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1964), 
the Washington Supreme Court indicated that the 
right to counsel extends only to critical stages in 
the judicial process and that the critical point is to 
be determined both from the nature of the proceed-
ings and from what actually occurs. The court there 
found that the preliminary hearing was not a trial in 
the sense that one could be found guilty, but was a 
mere inquest made to determine the existence of 
probable cause; and that since nothing that occurred 
at the preliminary hearing could be used against 
the defendant, it was not a critical stage which would 
warrant the appointment of counsel. The court care-
fully distinguished the Hamilton and White cases 
on the same basis that other cases heretofore cited 
and discussed have distinguished their application. 
A similar result was reached again by the 
Kansas Supreme Court in the case of-State v. Black· 
smith, 194 Kan. 643, 400 P,2d 743 (1965). In that case, 
the court further held [-ref erring to a previous 
Kansas case-J: 
"That any so-called alleged 'irregularity' pertaining 
to a preliminary examination is deemed to be waived 
where a defendant enters a voluntary plea of guilty 
in the district· court." 
This case is again precedent for the conclusion that 
the trial court in the case now before the court com-
mitted error in finding that the preliminary hearing 
circumstances justified the release of the respondent 
on habeas corpus. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Schu· 
macher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P.2d 584 (1965), also reached 
the same conclusion as the New Mexico and Kansc.s 
courts. Further, the Arizona court relied upon the 
decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in Applica· 
tion of Hoff, 393 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1964). Thus, almost 
every state surrounding Utah has adopted the posi-
tion that this court ·recognized in the case of State v. 
Braasch, supr~. -. 
In Poris v. State, 195 Kan. 313, 403 P.2d 959 (1965), 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled again that an in· 
digent defendant has no constitutional right to be 
ftirnished'court-appoiilted c::ounsel at his preliminarv 
hea.dn<{ . · 
, : ; A:"~i~ilar ~e~ult ~~~ reached in the decision ol 
State v. Atkins, 195 Kan. 182,403 P.2d 962.(1965). 
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In Butler v. Rundle, 206 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1965), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a pre-
liminary hearing was not a critical stage requiring 
the appointment of counsel for an indigent de-
fendant. Pennsylvania also reached the same result 
in James v. Russell, 207 A.2d 792 (Pa. 1965). 
The Ohio Court in Bussey v. Maxwell, 202 N.E.2d 
698 (Ohio 1964), ruled that a preliminary hearing was 
not a critical stage where its only purpose was in de-
termining whether the defendant should be held 
for arraignment in the court of general jurisdiction. 
It would substantially burden the brief of the 
appellant to point out the other numerous cases 
which have reached similar conclusions. Many of 
the cases are collected in the Defender's Newsletter 
referred to above. It is submitted, however, from ail 
these authorities, it should be overwhelmingly ap-
parent that the trial court in this case erroneously 
determined that the respondent was entitled to re-
lease on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if 
there was a failure to advise him of his rights to 
counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from an analysis of the record in 
this case that there was no factual basis sufficient 
to support the trial court's findings and determina-
tions. Further, the trial court made seriously er-
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roneous errors of law in deciding whether the re-
spondent was entitled to release by habeas corpus. 
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate tha.t 
the respondent voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. 
Further, the facts when taken against the burden 
of proof which the respondent must have 
maintained at the trial court in order to justify his 
release, conclusively demonstrates that there was no 
factual basis for habeas corpus. 
It is therefore submitted that this court should 
reverse the decision of the trial court and order the 
respondent's application for habeas corpus vacated 
and that he be remanded to the custody of the ap-
pellant to serve the remaining portion of his 
sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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